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Abstract
We analyze how reputational concerns of arbitrators affect the quality of their decision
process, in particular, information acquisition and bias. We assume that arbitrators differ
in their ability to observe the state of the world and that information acquisition is costly
and unobservable. We show that reputational concerns increase incentives for information
acquisition but may induce arbitrators to bias their decisions towards one party in the
dispute. This decision bias is greater when the dispute proceedings are confidential rather
than public.
Building on these results, we study the circumstances under which the parties to
a contract choose to employ arbitration rather than litigation in court to resolve their
disputes.
Keywords: arbitration, confidentiality, decision making, experts, information acquisi-
tion, reputational concerns.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study how reputational concerns of decision makers impact on the quality
of their decision process, in particular information acquisition and bias, and how this affects
the desirability of non-judicial institutions for dispute resolution. We focus on the case of
arbitration in commercial transactions.
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During contract negotiations, the parties to the contract may agree to insert a clause (the
‘arbitration clause’) providing for the use of arbitration as dispute-resolution mechanism.1 In
the event that a dispute arises, the parties then submit the dispute to an arbitrator (or to
an arbitral tribunal) who conducts the arbitral hearing and issues an award that binds the
parties. The arbitration clause usually defines the process by which the arbitrator will be
selected; often it also specifies the qualifications the arbitrator is required to have or his/her
identity.
There are different selection procedures. For example, parties may consult, or eliminate
and rank, names from lists of arbitrators maintained by arbitration institutions such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA). Parties may also opt for a tripartite arbitral panel,
where each party appoints her own arbitrator and then the party-appointed arbitrators select
a third arbitrator, who serves as the chair. A common aspect of the procedures is that parties’
preferences are taken into account in the selection of the arbitrator(s), making arbitrators’
future earning prospects dependent on them being in demand. The reputational concerns
of arbitrators towards the parties is the first main feature of arbitration, parties preferences
playing no role in the selection of court judges.
The second main feature of arbitration is finality. Under the court system, lower-court
decisions can be appealed on questions of law or (in some instances) of fact, and then be
reversed by an appeals court. Instead, most arbitral proceedings purport to be final and
binding, with the result that courts are reluctant to review arbitral awards, even if it is
alleged that the arbitrator found facts unsupported by evidence or misapplied the law.2
The third main feature of arbitration is confidentiality. Arbitration is not a public pro-
ceeding, contrary to trial before court. The arbitration clause may contain a confidentiality
provision establishing that contractual disputes will be kept confidential to the parties.3
In this paper we analyze the decision of the parties to choose arbitration rather than
litigation in court. We focus on how reputational concerns affect the arbitrator’s decision and
his effort, but we also study the role played by lack of appeals and confidentiality provision.
We show that arbitration works best when both parties in the dispute are corporations, as
1We focus on ‘ex ante’ arbitration agreements as opposed to ‘ex post’ arbitration agreements where the
parties agree to employ arbitration once a dispute has already arisen.
2One of the few grounds for vacating an arbitral award is that the arbitrator was corrupt, exceeded his
powers or there was evidence of partiality.
3Confidentiality is also the default option under many arbitration rules, such as the rules of the the London
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).
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reputational concerns generate benefits and no cost when both parties in the dispute are
long-lived. Disputes among individuals or between individuals and corporations are better
solved through litigation in court. Arbitration is also most beneficial for issues that are not
overly complex or when the value of confidentiality for the parties is high. Efficient appeals
systems instead call for litigation in court.
We incorporate the three main features of arbitration in a stylized model where arbitrators
have private information about their competency. More competent arbitrators are able to
acquire better information on the state of the world, i.e. the correct decision resolving a
dispute. The parties to the dispute have some private information about the state of the
world and have optimistic priors. Arbitrators care about appearing competent to the outside
market and to any party in the dispute who may need their service in the future. We refer
to such parties as ‘long-lived’ parties. ‘Short-lived’ parties are those unlikely to need arbitral
services again, say because of the limited extent of their business activities.
In this setting, reputational concerns with the parties generate two contrasting effects.
On the one hand, they increase the incentive for competent arbitrators to acquire costly and
unverifiable information on the state of the world. On the other hand, reputational concerns
induce decision bias by incompetent and uninformed arbitrators when a party in the dispute
is long-lived whilst the other one is short-lived.
The incentive of a competent arbitrator to acquire information comes from the parties
being more inclined to re-hire arbitrators who take correct decisions. Taking the correct
decision is more likely when the arbitrator is informed; thus information helps to signal
competency and to enhance future earning prospects.
The incentive of an incompetent and uninformed arbitrator to bias his decision comes
from the parties having biased priors. Ceteris paribus, a party is more likely to believe that
a decision is correct if the outcome is in her interest. When only one party in the dispute
is long-lived, the incompetent arbitrator will then bias his decision in favour of this party in
order to appear competent to her and enhance future earning prospects.
We further show that confidentiality provision increases decision bias. This is because the
market anticipates the direction of the bias and updates its belief about the competency of
arbitrator accordingly. As it is less competent arbitrators who bias their decisions, market
updating makes decision bias less rewarding. Confidentiality also reduces the incentives of
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the arbitrator to acquire information, because of its effect on the decision bias. Predictions
are then derived regarding the choice of confidentiality. When the parties are asymmetric
and they expect technical issues to arise in the event of a dispute, they will opt for no
confidentiality provision. Intuitively, when the subject matter is complex, providing incentives
to acquire information is critical. To increase incentives, the parties to the dispute may give up
confidentiality. Instead, confidentiality brings no cost to symmetric parties who are therefore
likely to always choose confidentiality.
Our results suggest that arbitrators have an incentive to favour long-lived parties, such as
corporations, at the expense of short-lived parties, such as individuals or small businesses. In
fact, because of the efficiency cost of decision bias, asymmetric parties are less likely to agree
to employ arbitration as a dispute-resolution process than symmetric parties. Symmetric and
long-lived parties are the most likely to choose arbitration; they face no decision bias and
strongest incentives for arbitrators to acquire information.
In the final part of the paper we formalize this intuition by explicitly comparing arbitration
with litigation in court, assuming that under the latter the decision maker has no reputational
concerns with the parties, the dispute proceedings are public and appeals are allowed. Our
results highlight the difference in incentives to decision makers under arbitration and under
litigation in court as one between ex ante and ex-post monitoring. Ex-ante monitoring is the
selection of arbitrators by the parties, whilst ex-post monitoring is the appeals system.4
Arbitrator bias is not uncommon. In the seminal U.S. Supreme Court Case Common-
wealth Coating Cort. v. Continental Casualty Co. (395 U.S. 145, 1968) one of the parties
discovered that the neutral arbitrator had previously provided certain consulting services for
the other party, and failure to disclose the commercial relationship was viewed as a manifest
violation of his duties. Since Commonwealth Coatings, a number of courts have considered
repeated economic contacts of one form or another as relevant evidence on the question of
arbitrator bias. Bloom and Cavanagh (1986) give evidence of arbitrator bias in favour of the
employer in wage disputes in labour relationships. Repeated players bias is also found and
discussed in Bingham (1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related literature,
whilst in section 3 we set up the model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium when the award is
confidential whilst section 5 consider public awards and the choice of confidentiality. Section
4For a model of monitoring of decision makers through appeals see Iossa and Palumbo (2005).
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6 compares arbitration with litigation in court. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
On reputational concerns in decision making
The paper is closely related to the recent literature on careerist decision makers, such as
regulators, managers or experts who try to prove their ability to make the correct decision.
In the context of dispute resolutions, Levy (2005) shows that careerist judges may contradict
precedents too often in order to signal their ability, whilst in the context of policy making,
Leaver (2004) argues that less able bureaucrats may use soft policies so as to keep interests
groups quiet and mistakes out of public eyes.5 We contribute to this literature by showing
how reputational concerns can lead to decision bias in arbitration. We also highlight the
trade off between decision bias and information acquisition and how this trade-off is resolved
depending on the degree of symmetry between the disputing parties. Finally, we explicitly
analyze the role of confidentiality in reputational models of decision making, and thus the
role of market monitoring.
On revolving doors
The paper is also related to the literature on revolving doors which analyzes how the
possibility to obtain lucrative industry jobs affects the performance of regulators (or public
officials in general). Post-regulatory employment may induce regulators to be lenient towards
the industry if the industry rewards opportunistic behaviour with future employments. It
may also result in regulators choosing overly-complex regulations so as to increase the value of
their expertise for the industry (see Heyes, 2003). Revolving doors can however generate the
positive effect of increasing incentives to invest in human capital that enhances qualifications
for a postagency job at the firm (see Che, 1995; and Salant, 1995). In our paper, contrary
to this literature, we focus on reputational issues and derive opportunistic behaviour from a
desire to appear competent. As shown by Bloom and Cavanagh (1986), there is only weak
evidence that parties reward "loyal" arbitrators by reappointing them. Evidence is much
stronger that parties value experience in arbitrators and good qualifications.
5 In these papers, as in ours, it is assumed that the quality of information is unverifiable ex post. The
quality of information is instead generally assumed verifiable in the literature on experts’ advice, where
reputational concerns can generate biased advice (in the form of herding or anti-herding) as shown by Levy
(2004), Bourjade and Jullien (2005) and Ottaviani and Soerensen (2006).
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On arbitration
Finally the paper is related to the literature on arbitration. Shavell (1995) discusses the
choice between litigation and alternative-dispute resolutions (ADR), including arbitration,
and suggests that ADR may be chosen because it may lower the cost of resolving disputes
or engender superior incentives through greater accuracy of result. In most studies on arbi-
tration, arbitrators are viewed as experts who are able to verify dimensions of commercial
contracts better than court judges (see also example Dixit, 2003; and Chakravarty andMakris,
2005). These papers cannot explain why contractual parties often but not always choose
to employ arbitration as a dispute-resolution process. They also do not discuss the role of
confidentiality or of selection of arbitrators.
3 The basic model
The players and the general setting
There are two periods and four players, an arbitrator (he), two parties, P1 (she) and P2
(she), and a market playerM (it). At the beginning of period 1, P1 and P2 enter a contractual
relationship involving issues of technical complexity summarized by a parameter χ ∈ [0, 1]
and decide which dispute-resolution process to use in the event of a dispute. They have two
options: arbitration and litigation in court. Under arbitration, the parties select the decision
maker (i.e. the arbitrator) and choose whether to insert a confidentiality provision in the
contract, appeals are not allowed. Under litigation in court, the decision-maker (i.e. the
judge) is randomly selected, the dispute proceedings are public information and appeals are
allowed. In this basic model we focus on the case of arbitration. We extend the basic model
to study the case of litigation in court in Section 6.
During period 1 a dispute exogenously arises over the terms of an existing contract. There
are two possible states, θ = 1 and θ = 2, and it is common knowledge that Pr(θ = 1) = 1/2.
State θ = 1 corresponds to a situation where the interpretation of the contract is in the
interest of P1, whilst state θ = 2 corresponds to a situation where the interpretation of the
contract is in the interest of P2. There are only two possible decisions, d ∈ {1, 2} : P1 wins the
dispute if d = 1 whilst P2 wins if d = 2. The value of winning for a party is 1. The ‘correct’
decision is d = θ, which is interpreted as the decision that maximizes the joint surplus from
the contractual relationship.
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Net of dispute-resolution costs, the parties’ joint surplus from the contractual relationship
is
U = Pr(d = θ)u+ ωc (1)
where u > 0 is the value of a correct decision; an incorrect decision is valued at zero.6 ω is a
dummy variable with ω = 1 in the presence of a confidentiality provision and ω = 0 otherwise.
c > 0 denotes the value of confidentiality for the parties stemming from the possibility that
market knowledge of the dispute negatively impacts on the firm’s reputation or share values.
The parties P1 and P2 can be either short-lived or long-lived. A long-lived party is more
likely to need arbitral services again in the future than a short-lived party. Long-lived parties
can be thought as corporations or parties with a large volume of affairs. Short-lived parties
can be thought as individuals or small businesses. We assume that whether a party is long-
lived or short lived is common knowledge, and, unless stated otherwise, P1 is long-lived whilst
P2 is short-lived. We capture the repeated interaction in a stylized way by assuming that in
period 2, P1 and M need the service of an arbitrator with probability 1, whilst P2 does not
need arbitral services.
The information of the parties and of the market
In modelling the information structure we wish to capture two central features of dispute-
resolution processes. First, the parties to a dispute are likely to have some information about
the state of the world. Second, at the time the parties start the arbitral proceedings, they
are likely to hold a positive view of their case, with Pi assigning a higher probability to θ = i
than Pj . Different priors is a standard assumption in the literature on dispute resolutions and
it is one of the main explanations as to why parties litigate rather than settle. In the context
of settlement bargaining with asymmetric information, it has been shown that settlement is
more likely to fail when each party has a positive signal about the state of the world. Thus,
when a case is not settled an inference can be drawn that each party is likely to have a
positive view about the case (see for example Schweizer, 1989).
Formally, we assume that in each state θ, Pi observes a private and unverifiable signal
σi ∈ {1, 2}. The realization of the signal depends on the state θ and on the identity of the
6This formulation captures in a reduced form the idea that better enforcement of contractual terms helps
to ensure better incentives for relationship-specific investments, which in turn increases the joint surplus from
the contractual relationship. Whilst, this is true in general contexts, Anderlini, Felli and Postelwaite (2006)
show that there can be instances where efficiency calls for the dipute-resolution process not to enforce the will
of the parties expressed in the contract.
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party: Pi is more likely to observe a positive signal σi = i than a negative signal σi = j ; Pi is
also more likely to observe a positive signal in the state where the correct decision is the one
in her interest (i.e. when θ = i) than the one against (i.e. θ = j). In particular, we assume
that in state i Pi always observes σi = i. In state j she observes σi = j with probability
ν and σi = i with probability 1 − ν. That is: Pr(σi = i |θ = i) = 1, Pr(σi = j |θ = i) = 0,
Pr(σi = j |θ = j) = ν and Pr(σi = i |θ = j) = 1− ν.
Accordingly, when Pi observes a positive signal, her posterior belief that θ = i is Pr(θ =
i |σi = i) =
1
2−ν , whilst if Pi observes a negative signal, she is certain that the state is j:
Pr(θ = i |σi = j) = 0. Thus, ν captures the precision of the information in the hands of the
parties. When ν = 0, parties are uninformed: each party observes σi = i regardless of the
state of the world. When ν = 1, parties are perfectly informed; observing σi = i reveals to Pi
that the state is θ = i, whilst observing σi = j reveals to Pi that the state is θ = j.
M has no private information. It observes d if the award is public; if the award is
confidential it observes nothing.
The competency and the information of the arbitrator
At the outset the arbitrator has no information. However, before taking a decision he
can choose to exert costly and unobservable effort into acquiring information about the state
of the world θ. The precision of the information acquired depends on the ability of the
arbitrator. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types t of arbitrators: the
competent (t = C) and the incompetent (t = I). If type C exerts effort, he observes θ with
probability 1, otherwise he observes nothing. Instead, type I observes nothing no matter how
hard he tries. The model can be generalized to continuous types (as in Levy 2005). The cost
of acquiring information in terms of disutility of effort is Ψ ∈ [0, 1]. Ψ is distributed according
to a cumulative distribution function F (Ψ, χ), with Fχ(Ψ, χ) < 0 : the more technical the
subject matter the higher the expected disutility of effort; we also assume that FχΨ ≥ 0,
which implies that greater technical complexity raises the expected disutility of effort at a
decreasing rate.
We denote by et the effort exerted by the arbitrator of type t, with et = 1 if the arbitrator
exerts effort and et = 0 otherwise. Since it is immediate that eI = 0, we shall focus on
effort of type C. The arbitrator knows his type, whilst P1 and P2, and M only know that
the fraction of type C is given by γ ∈ (0, 1) . For simplicity and without loss of generality
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we assume that Ψ is realized after a dispute has arisen and that the realized value of Ψ is
observable. Relaxing this assumption would just add an additional parameter.
The objectives of the arbitrator and selection of arbitrators
In expression (1), we have seen that parties value dispute-resolution processes where cor-
rect decisions are reached more often. We will show later in the paper that more competent
arbitrators are more likely to make correct decisions. This implicitly rationalizes a relation-
ship between the earning prospect of an arbitrator and his reputation for competency.7
To capture the reputational concerns of the arbitrator in a simple way, we assume that
the arbitrator’s income is equal to the belief held by the arbitrator’s ‘employer’ that the
arbitrator is competent. Thus, the arbitrator’s income in period 1 is equal to γ, and since
period 1-income plays no role, it will be disregarded.
In period 2, the arbitrator can be hired either by M or by the long-lived party P1. P1
and M update their beliefs rationally (being short-lived, the belief of P2 plays no role). We
denote by αdσ1 P
′
1s posterior belief that the arbitrator is competent upon observing signal σ1,
decision d, and given P ′1s conjecture about the strategy of C and I. The posterior belief of M
depends on whether there is confidentiality. Under confidentiality, M does not observe the
decision and therefore its posterior belief is equal to the prior γ. When instead the decision
is public information the posterior belief of M, given a decision d and M ′s conjecture about
the strategy of C and I, is denoted by γd. We then have that income in period 2, denoted
by y, is equal to the highest posterior belief of P1 and M . This reduced form captures the
idea that the belief of M affects the reservation income of an arbitrator, whilst the belief of
P1 affects the fee P1 is willing to pay.
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Assuming no discounting, the payoff of the arbitrator when he is type t is then given by
Π = y − etΨt (2)
where
y =


max
{
αdσ1, γ
}
if there is confidentiality
max
{
αdσ1, γ
d
}
if the award is public information
7We disregard the possibility that the arbitrator has outcome concerns since outcome concerns play a
limited role in what follows. In particular, they only serve to ensure that no pooling equilibrium exists.
8Any bargaining process where P1 does not have full bargaining power would lead to an equilibrium fee
higher than the reservation fee.
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Timing
Period 1. At the beginning of period 1, P1 and P2 enter a contractual relationship
involving technical issues of a dimension summarized by χ, and agree on whether to employ
arbitration or litigation in court. If they agree on arbitration they choose whether to opt for
confidentiality.
A dispute then arises with unobservable state of the world θ, and Ψ is realized. P1 and
P2 observe private signals σ1 and σ2 and the competent arbitrator observes θ if he chooses
eC = 1, and nothing otherwise. The incompetent arbitrator observes nothing.
The arbitrator chooses d, observed by P1 and P2, and by M if the award is public. P1,
P2 and M update their beliefs.
Period 2. The arbitrator receives Π, as defined in (2) and the disputing parties receive
their payoffs.
For simplicity there is no discounting.
4 Confidential award
4.1 The payoffs
We start by considering the case of confidentiality. We proceed as follows. First we study the
behaviour of C and of I, assuming that C has acquired information on θ. Then, in Section
4.3, we analyze the incentives for C to acquire information.
When the award is confidential, M ′s posterior belief that the arbitrator is competent is
equal to the prior γ. Thus the arbitrator can always obtain an income of at least γ in period 2.
The arbitrator will obtain an income higher than γ only if P ′1s posterior belief α
d
σ1
is greater
than γ. In particular, if the arbitrator observes θ = i and makes a decision d, his expected
income is given by
y = Pr(σ1 = 1 |θ = i)max{γ, α
d
1}+ Pr(σ1 = 2 |θ = i)max{γ, α
d
2} (3)
Instead, if the arbitrator has no information on the realization of θ, his expected income
is
y = Pr(σ1 = 1)max{γ, α
d
1}+ Pr(σ1 = 2)max{γ, α
d
2} (4)
Let us now analyze the behavior of C. When C observes θ = 1, he knows that P1 can
only have observed σ1 = 1, since Pr(σ1 = 1 |θ = 1) = 1. His expected income in period 2 is
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therefore y = max{γ, αd1} and if C chooses d = i his expected payoff is
V (d = i| θ = 1) = max{γ, αi1} (5)
Now consider the case where C observes θ = 2. Here C knows that P1 has observed σ1 = 1
with probability (1− ν) and σ1 = 2 with probability ν since Pr(σ1 = 1 |θ = 2) = 1− ν, and
Pr(σ1 = 1 |θ = 2) = ν. Thus, the expected payoff of C if he chooses d = i is
V (d = i| θ = 2) = (1− ν)max{γ, αi1}+ νmax{γ, α
i
2} (6)
Finally, consider the behavior of I. Since I has no information on the state of the world,
his expected income is given by (4), for any given decision d. Using Pr(σ1 = 1) =
1
2 (2− ν)
and Pr(σ1 = 2) =
1
2ν, it follows that if I chooses d = i his expected payoff is
V (d = i) =
1
2
[
(2− ν)max{γ, αi1}+ νmax{γ, α
i
2}
]
(7)
4.2 Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the decision-making behaviour of arbitrators when the award is
confidential. Pooling equilibria are of limited interest and will be disregarded.9 In what
follows we let superscripts ll, ls, ss denote respectively the cases with two long-lived parties,
only one, or none.
Proposition 1 Let eC = 1. Under arbitration with a confidentiality provision, when one
party to the dispute is long-lived whilst the other party is short-lived, at the equilibrium a
decision bias in favour of the long-lived party arises. In particular, the competent arbitrator
chooses d = θ whilst the incompetent arbitrator chooses d = 1 with probability ẑls, where
ẑls = 12 for ν = 0, 1 and ẑ
ls ∈ (12 , 1) for ν = 0, 1.
Proof : see the Appendix.
9 It is sufficient for the arbitrator to have minimal outcome concerns that pooling equilibria do not exist.
To see this, let µ denote the benefit for the arbitrator from taking the correct decision and consider the case
where both C and I choose d = i. Then using Bayes rule we have: αi1 = α
i
2 = γ. In this case when C observes
θ = j, if he chooses d = i he obtains a payoff of γ, whilst if he chooses d = j, he obtains
V (d = j| θ = j) = µ+
[
Pr (σ1 = 1| θ = j)max{γ, α
j
1}+ Pr (σ1 = 2| θ = j)max{γ, α
j
2}
]
which is greater than γ.
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The equilibrium involves partial separation of types. The way for C to transmit informa-
tion about his type in the clearest possible way is to select a different decision for any different
θ, as P1 has some information on θ. Ruling out mirror equilibria, this leads C to choose d = θ.
I, being uninformed, cannot do the same. He then biases his decision in favour of P1 with
the aim to appear competent to her and enhance his earning prospects. I anticipates that
since P1 has a biased prior (namely she is more likely to observe σ1 = 1 than σ1 = 2), she is
more likely to (mistakenly) take a decision d = 1 as correct. At the equilibrium I then mixes
between the two decisions, choosing d = 1 with probability greater than 1/2. An equilibrium
where I chooses d = 1 with probability 1 cannot arise since a decision d = 2 would then
convey competence and give incentives for I to deviate.
There are only two cases where the decision bias does not arise: when the parties are
uninformed, ν = 0, and when the parties are perfectly informed , ν = 1. In both cases the
belief of P1 following a decision d are symmetrical and the only equilibrium has ẑls = 1/2.
Proposition 1 has shown that reputational concerns create a decision bias in favour of P1;
the corollary below highlights how this bias is ultimately due to the parties being asymmetric.
Corollary 1 With symmetric parties, i.e. when parties are either both long-lived or both
short lived, there is no decision bias under arbitration:
ẑll = ẑss =
1
2
.
Proof : see the Appendix.
4.3 Information acquisition
Suppose now that eC = 0. In this case C has no information about the state of the world
and his behavior is the same as the behaviour of I. We can therefore calculate the value of
information for C by comparing the expected payoff of C when eC = 1 with the expected
payoff of I.
Proposition 2 Under arbitration with a confidentiality provision, when one party to the
dispute is long-lived whilst the other party is short-lived, the value of information for the
competent arbitrator is given by
Ψ̂ls =
1
2
(
α11 (.)− γ
)
(8)
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where α11 (.) =
γ
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ)ẑls
and where Ψ̂ls (.) is increasing in the precision of information
of the parties, ν, and decreasing in the decision bias (ẑls− 12). The competent arbitrator exerts
effort into information acquisition for all Ψ ≤ Ψ̂ls.
Proof: see the Appendix.
In principle, arbitration rules could be designed in such a way as to take away the control
by the parties over the selection of the arbitrator so as to eliminate the decision bias.10
However, this effect comes at a cost since reputational concerns create the incentives of
the arbitrator to exert effort in information acquisition. Expression (8) in fact shows that
information is valuable to C as it helps to increase his future earning prospect above market
rate γ by an amount proportional to the posterior belief of P1, α
1
1.
Intuitively, C has incentives to appear competent to P1. This is easier if C has information
about θ because the greater ability to acquire information is the advantage that C has over
I. By observing θ, C can predict better than I the realization of the signal σ1 and therefore
the information that P1 holds about the state of the world. This helps C taking the (correct)
decision that signals his competency to P1. Reputational concerns with M have instead no
impact on the effort of the arbitrator since M is uninformed about θ and cannot observe the
decision.
Proposition 2 also shows that C ′s effort increases with the precision of the information
held by P1 (as captured by ν). Intuitively, as ν increases, the likelihood that P1 will indeed
perceive as correct the decision d = θ made by C also increases. A greater decision bias
(higher ẑls) instead reduces the effort in information acquisition, by lowering the posterior
belief of P1 when d = 1 and σ1 = 1.
Consider now how effort in information acquisition changes with the identity of the parties
in the dispute. The proposition below suggests that not only that reputational concerns with
the parties create incentives for the arbitrator to acquire information, but also that the
relationship is monotone.
Proposition 3 The incentives for the arbitrator to acquire information are greatest when
both parties in the dispute are long-lived and lowest when both parties in the dispute are
10This is for example what the LCIA has done.
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short-lived:
Ψ̂ll > Ψ̂ls > Ψ̂ss
with
Ψ̂ll = α11
(
ẑls
)
− γ
Ψ̂ss = 0
where α11
(
ẑls
)
= γ
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ)ẑls
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that when the realized level of Ψ is greater than Ψ̂, it is public information that the
arbitrator will not have sufficient incentives to acquire information and arbitration performs
very poorly. What exactly happens in this case is irrelevant to our analysis; it could be that
the parties renegotiate and decide to go to court, or that they throw a coin. For simplicity
we assume that when Ψ > Ψ̂ each party wins with probability 12 . It follows that the ex-ante
payoff of the parties under arbitration with a confidentiality provision is given by
Ûk =
1
2
(1 + F (Ψ̂k, χ)γ)u+ c; k = ll, ls, ss (9)
which in light of Proposition 3 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The surplus of the parties from employing arbitration as dispute-resolution
mechanism is greatest when both parties in the dispute are long-lived and lowest when both
parties in the dispute are short-lived:
Û ll (γ, ν) > Û ls (γ, ν) > Ûss (γ, ν)
Remark 1 We have assumed that the parties suffer a loss from an incorrect decision but we
have ruled out the possibility that a decision bias is harmful to the parties per se. However, in
practice the decision bias can indeed reduce the joint surplus from the contractual relationship,
when for example it is costly to raise funds to compensate the short-lived party for the future
unfair division of the surplus that the decision bias will generate. If we introduced an explicit
cost of decision bias, the case for arbitration with asymmetric parties would be further reduced.
Our qualitative results would however remain unchanged.
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5 Choosing confidentiality
Now suppose that the parties choose to opt for a public award. The results are qualitatively
similar to the ones under confidentiality provision, the only difference stemming from M now
being able to observe the decision made by the arbitrator and update its belief accordingly,
so that y = max
{
αdσ1 , γ
d
}
.
Proposition 4 Let eC = 1. Under arbitration, with public proceedings, when one party to
the dispute is long-lived whilst the other party is short-lived, at the equilibrium a decision bias
in favour of the long-lived party arises. The competent arbitrator always chooses d = θ whilst
the incompetent arbitrator chooses d = 1 with probability z˜ls, where z˜ls = 12 for ν = 0, 1 and
z˜ls ∈ (12 , 1) for ν = 0, 1. Compared to the case of confidentiality, the decision bias is reduced:
z˜ls ≤ ẑls.
Proof : see the Appendix.
The decision bias in favour of the long-lived party is greater when the award is confidential
than when it is public. Since in equilibrium it is type I who biases his decision in favour
of P1, M
′s posterior belief that the arbitrator is competent is higher when M observes a
decision d = 2 than when he observes d = 1 (i.e. γ1 > γ2 when z > 12). Other things equal,
this decreases the expected gain of I from taking a decision d = 1 and thus his incentives to
bias his decision in favour of the long-lived party.
We can now calculate how the incentives of C to acquire information change with a public
award.
Lemma 1 Under arbitration, in the absence of a confidentiality provision, the value of in-
formation for the arbitrator is given by
Ψ˜ll (γ, ν) = Ψ̂ll
Ψ˜ls (γ, ν) =
1
2
(
α11
(
z˜ls
)
− γ2(z˜ls
)
)
Ψ˜ls (γ, ν) = Ψ̂ss
where α11
(
z˜ls
)
= γ
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ)z˜ls
and γ2
(
z˜ls
)
=
1
2
γ
1
2
γ+(1−γ)(1−z˜ls)
. Compared to the case of
confidentiality, incentives to acquire information are stronger: Ψ˜k (.) ≥ Ψ̂k (.).
15
Proof : see the Appendix.
As under confidentiality, with public proceedings the incentives for C to acquire informa-
tion stem from the reputational concerns of the arbitrator. However, the absence of decision
bias increases the incentives for C to acquire information. Given that in case ls the bias is
smaller when the award is public than when it is confidential, incentives to acquire informa-
tion are greater when the award is public. In the remaining cases, ll and ss, confidentiality
has no impact on the effort of the arbitrator.
In light of Proposition 4 and Lemma 1, the ex ante payoff of the parties under public
proceedings is
U˜k =
1
2
(
1 + F (Ψ˜k, χ)γ
)
u ; k = ll, ls, ss (10)
and, conditional on the parties employing arbitration in the event of a dispute, the parties
will choose to insert a confidentiality provision in the contract if
Ûk ≥ U˜k
where Ûk and U˜k are given by (9) and (10), respectively. From Lemma 1 and from differenti-
ating the difference between Û and U˜ with respect to χ, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) Conditional on the parties using arbitration, the incentives of the par-
ties to choose confidentiality are greater for symmetric parties, than when the parties are
asymmetric. (ii) Lower technical complexity decreases incentives for confidentiality.
Proof: see the Appendix.
We have seen in Lemma 1 that confidentiality reduces the effort of the arbitrator when
parties are asymmetric. When the subject matter is complex, providing incentives to C to
acquire information is critical. This explains point (i). To increase incentives for information
acquisition, asymmetric parties may then choose to give up confidentiality. Instead, when
parties are both long-lived or are both short-lived there is no decision bias and the effort of
the arbitrator is unaffected by the presence of a confidentiality provision. Confidentiality will
then optimally be chosen whenever arbitration is chosen, which explains point (ii).
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6 Arbitration versus Court
6.1 Selection of arbitrators by the parties
In this section we compare arbitration with litigation in court, where litigation in court
is identified as a dispute-resolution process in which the decision-maker (i.e., the judge) is
randomly selected, the dispute proceedings are public information and appeals are allowed.
Since the parties in the dispute play no role in the selection of the judge, there is no role for
reputational concerns with the parties under litigation in court.11
However, the judge cares about appearing competent to M . We capture the judge’s
reputational concerns by assuming that the judge’s income is equal to the posterior belief of
M , following a decision d and any information that comes through the appeals.
To study the role of appeals, we modify the basic model as follows. We assume that
there is an appeals court that is able to find verifiable evidence of the correct decision with
probability r, whilst with probability (1−r) it finds nothing and confirms the initial decision.
The parameter r captures in a simple way the efficacy of the appeal system. Whether the
appeals court finds evidence is observable. Thus there is no agency problem with the appeals
court, which allows us to focus on the incentives of the lower-court judge.
Recourse to appeal is costly for the party seeking an appeal; the cost is a random variable
H distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 1]. We assume that H is realized only after an
initial decision is made, which implies that the judge views appeals as uncertain. Relaxing
this assumption has no qualitative impact on our results; it only adds an additional parame-
ter. The following proposition then summarizes the characteristics of the equilibrium under
litigation in court.
Proposition 6 Let eC = 1. Under litigation in court, at the equilibrium C chooses d = θ,
whilst type I randomizes by choosing d = 1 with probability z and d = 2 with probability 1−z.
There is no decision bias: z = 12 regardless of whether the parties in the dispute are short
lived or long lived.
Take the behaviour of the losing party. Upon observing a decision d = i, Pj never goes to
trial if she has observed a negative signal σj = i, since she knows that Pr (θ = j|σj = i) = 0.
11We are implicitly ruling out the possibility that the judge in period 1 become an arbitrator in period
2. Relaxing this assumption would have no qualitative impact on our results concerning the choice between
arbitration and litigation in court, although it could introduce a decision bias in favour of the long-lived party
also under litigation in court.
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Instead, Pj may gain from appealing if she has observed a positive signal σj = j. In particular,
Pj will choose to appeal if she has sufficiently high expectations to reverse the initial decision,
that is if
rPr (θ = j|σj = j, d = i)−H ≥ 0
The incentive of the losing party to appeal increases in r and decreases in the cost of an
appeal, H. For all H ≤ H
i
, where, using Bayes rule and players’ equilibrium strategies,
H
i
≡ rPr (θ = j|σj = j, d = i) =


r(1−γ)z
γ(1−ν)+(2−ν)(1−γ)z if d = 1
r(1−γ)(1−z)
γ(1−ν)+(2−ν)(1−γ)(1−z) if d = 2
the losing party will appeal if and only if she has observed a positive signal. For all H > H
i
,
the losing party never appeals.
Now consider the payoff of type C and the role that the information conveyed through the
appeals process plays in shaping the reputation of the judge. Note that frequency of reversal
on appeals plays indeed a significant part in judicial promotion in almost all countries (see
e.g. Miceli and Cosgel, 1994).
Let C choose d = θ. With probability H
i
, H ≤ H
i
is realized and the losing party appeals
if and only if she has observed a positive signal. Since d = θ, in appeal, C′s decision is proven
correct with probability r, and, through Bayesian updating M ′s posterior belief is given by
γi =
γ
γ + (1− γ)z
With probability 1− r, the appeals court does not observe any verifiable information and
the initial decision is automatically confirmed. In this case, however, the signal of the losing
party is inferred by M through her decision to appeal. Thus M ′s posterior beliefs, following
a decision d = i is
γ
i
=
γ (1− ν)
γ (1− ν) + (2− ν) (1− γ)z
(11)
Finally, when H > H
i
is realized, which occurs with probability (1−H
i
), appeals costs
are so high that under no circumstances will the losing party consider to appeal. Thus no
information about the correctness of C′s decision is revealed.
In light of the above, the payoff of C from choosing d = θ is
V C (d = i| θ = i) = H
i
(
rγi + (1− r) γ
i
)
+ (1−H
i
)γi
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with γi given by (15).
Consider now the payoff of I from randomizing between decisions. With probability 12 , I
takes the correct decision and obtains the same payoff as C. With probability 12 , I
′s decision
is incorrect. In this case, with probability rH
i
, the decision is reversed in appeal and I ′s type
is fully revealed. In the remaining case, M ′s posterior beliefs is the same as in the discussion
above for type C and thus is given by (11). It follows that the expected payoff of I when he
chooses d = i is
V I(d = i) =
1
2
V C (d = i| θ = i) +H
i
(1− r) γ
i
+
1
2
(1−H
i
)γi
By equating V I(d = 1) to V I(d = 2), we obtain z = 12 . The difference between EV
C and
EV I ≡ V I(d = 1) gives the value of information under litigation in court
Ψ =
1
2
rH
1
γ1
In light of this, the ex ante payoff of the parties under litigation in court in case k is
U(r) =
[
1
2
(
1 + F (Ψ, χ)γ
)
+
1
2
(1− γ) rH
1
(
r −H
1
)]
u
and it is immediate that the utility of the parties is independent of whether they are long-lived
or short lived, since period 2 plays no role. The following proposition is then obtained.
Proposition 7 (i) There exists a cutoff value of r, denoted by rk(c) such that for r ≤ rk(c)
the parties prefer arbitration to litigation in court, whilst for r > rk(c), the opposite holds. (ii)
rk(c) is non-decreasing in c, that is parties are more likely to prefer arbitration to litigation
in court when the value of confidentiality is high; (iii) rll(c) < rls(c) < rss(c), the parties are
most likely to choose arbitration when they are both long-lived whilst they are least likely to
choose arbitration when they are both short lived.
Proof: see the Appendix.
To highlight the role of selection of arbitrators by the parties as opposed to random
selection of judges under litigation in court, consider the case where there are no appeals under
litigation in court. This occurs when r = 0. In this case, the incentives to acquire information
are weaker under litigation in court than under arbitration because of the incentives that
reputational concerns with the parties generate under arbitration. For this reason the parties
prefer arbitration to litigation in court when r = 0.
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Now consider the opposite case, where appeals take place and are perfectly informative, as
is the case when r = 1. Appeals improve the quality of the decision under litigation in court
for two reasons. First, if there is an appeal, the correct decision is found with probability
r = 1. Second, if there is no appeal but the cost of an appeal is low, it is inferred that the
losing party had a pessimistic view as to the probability of winning, which perfectly reveals
her signal. Because of these two reasons, the decision maker is subject to a better assessment
of the quality of his decision than in a system such as arbitration where there are no appeals.
Bing the assessment symmetric, there is also no decision bias. Finally, under litigation in
court the incompetent decision maker faces the threat of reversal in appeal where reversal
perfectly revels his incompetency, whereas under arbitration, the arbitrator’s incompetency
is never perfectly revealed to the market. For this reason incentives to acquire information
are higher under litigation in court than under arbitration, and parties prefer litigation in
court to arbitration.
Cases where r ∈ (0, 1) fall between these two extremes. Then we obtain two results.
First, arbitration is more likely to be chosen when the value of confidentiality is high (point
(ii) in Proposition 7). This is because the parties can always choose confidentiality under
arbitration, whilst they cannot choose it under litigation in court. Second, arbitration is
most likely to be chosen when parties are both long-lived parties (point (iii) in Proposition
7). This follows from the identity of the parties (short-lived vs. long-lived) playing no role
under litigation in court, whilst it does play a role under arbitration (Corollary 1).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the three main features of arbitration, namely, selection of
arbitrators by the parties, finality of the decision and confidentiality, may result in biased and
uninformed decision making when the parties to the dispute are asymmetric. In this respect
the paper predicts that asymmetric parties will be, ceteris paribus, less inclined to choose
arbitration as their dispute-resolution mechanism than symmetric and long-lived parties.
However, selection of arbitrators by the parties has beneficial effects since it compensates for
the lack of an appeals mechanism as monitoring device for arbitrators. Its effects are the
highest when both parties to the disputes are long lived.
Our results help to explain the role for arbitration institutions. Arbitration institutions
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have created a market for their services by developing mechanisms for selecting and mon-
itoring their recommended arbitrators so as to reduce problems of bias (for an extensive
discussion, see Drahozal, 2001). Some institutions have even chosen explicitly to be in charge
of appointing arbitrators (for example the LCIA). In any case, the list of arbitrators held by
the arbitration institution is normally consulted by the parties, and the institutions update
and change their list of arbitrators on a regular basis. Arbitration institutions also require
their arbitrators to disclose any information that might be relevant to the standards of neu-
trality, including service as a neutral in any past or pending case involving any of the parties
(see e.g. ICC Rules of Arbitration or AAA’s National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes). Failure to abide by these rules can expose the award to challenge, and jeopardize
the reputation of the arbitrator. Also according to the AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
(2004), for example, for a reasonable period of time after the decision of a case, arbitrators
should avoid entering into any business, professional, or personal relationship with any of
the parties to the disputes. Failure to comply is likely to lead to the arbitrator being struck
off the institutional list of recommended arbitrators.12 An explicitly modelling of the role of
arbitral institutions could constitute an interesting scope for future research.
Our results also highlight the importance of leaving the parties free to choose the dispute-
resolution process. With voluntary arbitration the nonrepeated players (the short-lived party)
has the option to insist on an unbiased dispute-resolution process, whilst with mandatory
arbitration he does not. The risk of bias embedded in the use of mandatory arbitration has
long been recognized by legal scholars, see for example Fitz (1999).
A possibility not analyzed in this paper is the use of tripartite arbitral panels. Practition-
ers tend to recommends the use of tripartite panels for disputes with a great financial stake,
and the use of a sole arbitrator otherwise. This suggests that incentives to make the correct
decision may be stronger when the number of arbitrators increases. However, the incentives
to acquire information of an individual arbitrator may be weaker, because of free riding. A
full analysis of decision making by tripartite arbitral panels could constitute an interesting
scope for future research.
12Legal scholars have also suggested (see Bingham 1998) to increase the pool from which arbitrators may
be selected so as to render their economic interest less direct, or to adopt random assignment of arbitrators
to lists so as to reduce the likelihood of repeat appearance on each list of any single arbitrator. In Thomas
v. Workmen’s Compensation App. Board, 680 A.2d 24 (Pa. Comm. 1996), the court used the fact that an
arbitator was randomly assigned to hear the case as tending to show there was no bias.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof uses a series of Lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let eC = 1. Under arbitration with a confidentiality provision, at the equilibrium
(i) type I uses mixed strategies, implying
ν
[
max{γ, α22} −max{γ, α
1
2}
]
= (2− ν)
[
max{γ, α11} −max{γ, α
2
1}
]
(12)
and (ii) type C always chooses d = θ.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Suppose by contradiction that I chooses d = i with probability
1. Using Bayes rule this implies αi1, α
i
2 < 1 and α
j
1 = α
j
2 = 1. Therefore I obtains
[
Pr(σ1 = 1)max
{
γ, αi1
}
+ Pr(σ1 = 2)
{
γ, αi2
}]
if d = i
1 if d = j
and I has incentives to deviate and choose d = j. It follows that in equilibrium I must
strictly randomize between d = 1 and d = 2. Setting V (d = 1) = V (d = 2), using (7) yields
expression (??).
(ii) By rearranging terms we can rewrite (??) as
[
(1− ν)max{γ, α21}+ νmax{γ, α
2
2}
]
−
[
(1− ν)max{γ, α11}+ νmax{γ, α
1
2}
]
=
[
max{γ, α11} −max{γ, α
2
1}
]
which in light of (5) and (6) suggests that if LHS = RHS > 0, then C always strictly prefers
d = θ to d = θ. If LHS = RHS < 0, then C prefers to choose d = θ for d = θ. The case of
d = θ is a mirror equilibrium which we disregard. 
From Lemma 2, we can calculate the posterior belief of P1. Using Bayes rule and the
arbitrator′s equilibrium strategies, we have
α11 =
γ
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ)z ; α
1
2 = 0
α21 =
γ(1−ν)
γ(1−ν)+(2−ν)(1−γ)(1−z) ;α
2
2 =
γ
γ+(1−γ)(1−z)
(13)
where z denotes the probability that I chooses d = 1. We use the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 When the award is confidential, at the solution we have: α11, α
2
2 > γ > α
2
1, α
1
2.
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Proof of Lemma 3. By taking the difference between αdσi and γ, we have α
2
2 > γ > α
1
2,
and α11 > γ > α
2
1 if z ≤
1
(2−ν) and vice versa. Suppose that z >
1
(2−ν) and therefore
α22, α
2
1 > γ > α
1
1, α
1
2. Then (??) implies: ν
(
α22 − γ
)
= (2 − ν)[
(
γ − α21
)
, which cannot hold
since γ < α22, α
2
1. Therefore it must be z ≤
1
(2−ν) . 
In light of Lemma 3, condition (??) becomes
ν(α22 − γ) = (2− ν)
(
α11 − γ
)
, (14)
i.e,
νz
γ + (1− γ)(1− z)
=
(2− ν) (1− (2− ν) z)
γ + (2− ν) (1− γ)z
Let l(z) ≡ νz
γ+(1−γ)(1−z) and r(z) ≡
(2−ν)(1−(2−ν)z)
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ)z in the above expression, thus l(z)−r(z)
is the difference in the expected payoff of I from choosing d = 2 rather than d = 1. Note that
l(zls) is increasing in z, with l(z = 0) = 0 and l(z = 1) = νγ , whilst r(z) is decreasing in z,
with r(z = 0) = (2−ν)γ > 0 and r(z = 1) =
−(1−ν)(2−ν)
γ+(2−ν)(1−γ) < 0. Thus l(z) − r(z) is increasing
in z : the greater the probability z that I chooses d = 1 the lower the posterior belief of P1,
upon observing d = 1, that the arbitrator is competent . Furthermore, a solution to (14)
with z > 0 always exists and it is unique.13 At z = 12 we have
l(z =
1
2
)− r(z =
1
2
) =
ν 12
γ + (1− γ)12
−
(2− ν)ν 12
γ + (2− ν) (1− γ)12
{
< 0 for ν = 0, 1
= 0 for ν = 0, 1
which suggests that at z = 12 , I strictly prefers to choose d = 1 to d = 2 for ν = 0, 1; whilst
z = 12 is an equilibrium for ν = 0, 1. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that also P2 is long-lived and let β
d
σ2 denote his posterior
belief that the arbitrator is competent following a decision d, upon observing a signal σ2
and using players’ equilibrium strategies. Following the same procedure as for the case of
asymmetric parties, the payoff of C from choosing d = θ is given by
V (d = 1| θ = 1) = (1− ν)α11 + νβ
1
1
V (d = 2| θ = 2) = (1− ν)β22 + να
2
2
13Since r(z = 1(2−ν) ) = 0, at the solution we must have z <
1
(2−ν) .
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whilst the payoff of I is
V (d = 1) =
1
2
[
(2− ν)α11 + νβ
1
1
]
V (d = 2) =
1
2
[
(2− ν)β22 + να
2
2
]
Therefore, the mixed strategy condition becomes
(2− ν)α11 + νβ
1
1 = (2− ν)β
2
2 + να
2
2
leading to ẑll = 12 . A similar procedure shows that ẑ
ss = 12 when both P1 and P2 are short-
lived.
Proof of Proposition 2 From Lemma 2, and from (5) and (6), the expected payoff of
C when he exerts effort is given by
EV C =
1
2
(
α11 + (1− ν)γ + να
2
2
)
whilst the expected payoff of C when he chooses eC = 0 from Lemma 2 and from (7) is given
by (using the fact that V (d = 1) = V (d = 2))
EV I =
1
2
(
(2− ν)α11 + νγ
)
Taking the difference EV C −EV I yields Ψ̂ls in expression (8). Differentiating Ψ̂(.) with
respect to ẑls we have ∂Ψ̂(.)
∂ẑls
< 0 for ẑls > 12 .
Proof of Proposition 3. By repeating the same procedure as in Proof of Proposition
2and by using the Proof of Corollary 1, we obtain Ψ̂ss = 0 and
Ψ̂ll =
1
2
(
α11 − γ
)
+
1
2
(
β22 − γ
)
where β22 = α
1
1, since z
ll = 12 .
Proof of Proposition 4. Using Bayes rule we have
γ1 =
1
2
γ
1
2
γ+(1−γ)z
γ2 =
1
2
γ
1
2
γ+(1−γ)(1−z)
(15)
where γ1 > γ > γ2 for z < 1/2 and vice versa. The mixed strategy condition now leads to
ν
[
max{γ2, α22} −max{γ
1, α12}
]
= (2− ν)
[
max{γ1, α11} −max{γ
2, α21}
]
(16)
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Taking the difference αdσi − γ
d, using (13) and (15), it is easy to show that an equivalent
version of Lemma 3 continues to hold. In particular, αd=σ1σ1 > γ
d > αd =σ1σ1 for ν, z > 0.
Condition (16), then becomes
ν
[
α22 − γ
1
]
= (2− ν)
[
α11 − γ
2
]
which can be rewritten as
ν
(
α22 − γ
)
− (2− ν)
(
α11 − γ
)
= ν
(
γ1 − γ
)
+ (2− ν)
(
γ − γ2
)
(17)
where
ν
(
γ1 − γ
)
+ (2− ν)
(
γ − γ2
){ ≥ 0 if z ≤ 0.5
≤ 0 if z ≥ 0.5
(18)
Let z˜ls denote the solution in z to (17) and suppose, by contradiction, that z˜ls ≤ 1/2 for
ν = 0, 1. Then from (17) and (18), the LHS of (17) must be positive. Since the LHS of (17) is
increasing in z and equal to zero at z = ẑ (from Proposition 1 and in particular condition 14)
it follows that z˜ ≥ ẑ. Since ẑ > 0.5 (from Proposition 1), we have a contradiction. Therefore,
z˜ls > 0.5. This in turn implies from (18) that at z = z˜ls, the LHS of (17) must be negative.
Using the fact that the LHS is increasing in z and equal to zero for z = ẑls it follows that
z˜ls ∈
(
1
2 , ẑ
ls
)
.
Proof of Lemma 1. From Lemma 2, the expected payoff of C when he chooses eC = 1
is given by
EV C =
1
2
[
α11 + (1− ν)γ
2 + να22
]
whilst the expected payoff of C when he chooses e = 0 coincides with that of I, given by
EV I =
1
2
[
(2− ν)α11 + νγ
1
]
Taking the difference between the two expected payoffs we have
EV E −EV I =
1
2
[
ν
(
α22 − γ
1
)
− (1− ν)
(
α11 − γ
2
)]
which in light of ν
(
α22 − γ
1
)
= (2− ν)
(
α11 − γ
2
)
from (16), yields
Ψ˜ls (γ, ν) =
1
2
(
α11
(
z˜ls (γ, ν)
)
− γ2
(
z˜ls (γ, ν)
))
Simple computations show that for z˜ls (.) = ẑls (.) = 0.5, Ψ˜ (.) = Ψ̂ (.) . Since 0 > ∂
∂z˜ls
Ψ˜ (.) >
∂
∂ẑls
Ψ̂ (.) , it follows that Ψ˜ (.) > Ψ̂ (.) , for z˜ls (.) < ẑls (.) .
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Proof of Proposition 5 It follows from FχΨ(.) ≥ 0, implying Fχ(Ψ˜ (.) , χ) ≤ Fχ(Ψ̂, χ).

Proof of Proposition 7. With a slight abuse of notation, let us denote by ÛAk and U˜
A
k
the expected payoff of the parties in case k under arbitration, respectively when there is a
confidentiality provision and when there is not. Following the same procedure as in Section
3, we have Û llA > Û
ls
A > Û
ss
A . (ii). Comparing U with max{U˜
k
A, Û
k
A}, noting that U(r) is
increasing in r, with U(r) ≥ U˜Ass =
1
2 (1 + F (χ)γ) , for all r, and U(r = 1) > U˜
A
ll > Ur = 0),
the result follows.
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